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Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General
2020/CCZ/0013 [2021]
Florence Chumpuka1, and Mbaka Wadham 2
Facts
On August 18, 2021 the Constitutional Court of Zambia (ConCourt) released a decision in the
case where Chapter One Foundation, the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating
Committee for Gender and Development Registered Trustees, and Harriet Chibuta (suing in
her capacity as Executive Director of Young Women in Action) (the P
etitioners) requested the interpretation of Articles 259(1)(b) and (c) and 173 (1)(j) and (k) of
the Constitution as amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016
(hereinafter “Constitution”). Specifically, the petitioners inquired whether the President of the
Republic of Zambia in appointing Cabinet Ministers, Provincial Ministers and in nominating
Members of Parliament during the 2016 general elections contravened Articles 259(1)(b) and
(c) and 173 (1)(j) and (k) of the Constitution on the ground that he did not consider gender
parity, equitable representation of youth and persons with disabilities as alleged by the
Petitioners.
The Petitioners highlighted that of the 164 Members of Parliament, only 29 are female, two are
youth and one is a person with disabilities. Of the 30 Cabinet positions, only nine are occupied
by female Cabinet members. There are no female, youth nor persons with disabilities among
the ten appointed Provincial Ministers. Finally, there were only two female Members of
Parliament out of the 8 nominated Members of Parliament. The Petitioners contended that the
nomination and appointment procedures made by the then President, were unconstitutional as
the President’s nominations of Members of Parliament and appointments of Cabinet and
Provincial Ministers did not reflect gender parity or equitable representation of youth and
persons with disabilities as per the Constitution of Zambia.
The Petitioners were unsuccessful in their bid. However, the ruling by the ConCourt was
controversial and exposed flawed reasoning held by the majority of the ConCourt.
Significance
At first glance this case is one of statutory interpretation of Articles 259(1)(b) and (c) and 173
(1)(j) and (k) of the Constitution of Zambia. Essentially, the ConCourt was responsible for
interpreting these Articles of the Constitution and for once settle how these provisions are to
be interpreted when dealing with gender parity, and the equitable inclusion of youth and
persons with disabilities in the political sphere. The ConCourt was required to examine the
President’s appointment decisions and determine whether those actions complied with the
Constitution. What the decision turned out to be was one which reinforced outdated gender
stereotypes and flawed reasoning pertaining to the under-representation of women, youth, and
persons with disabilities in the political realm. More concerning, it exposed the ConCourt’s
reluctance to render decisions which may call to task incorrect decisions by a Head of State
and revealed a potential lack of judicial independence within the judiciary.
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We will discuss this case in three sections. The first section will examine statutory
interpretation of the impugned Articles of the Constitution. Second, we will address the gender
stereotypes that the Majority employs in rendering their decision. Third, we will address the
importance of judicial independence and accountability on the bench.
Statutory Interpretation
It is widely accepted within common law jurisdictions that in matters of statutory interpretation,
There is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme
of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. 3
In addition, the Supreme Court of Zambia provided guidance on the minimum standard
required in each judicial decision:
Every judgment must reveal a review of evidence, where applicable, a summary of the
arguments and submissions, if made, findings of fact, the reasoning of the court on the facts
and the application of the law and authorities if any, to the facts. 4
In this case, the ConCourt was called to interpret the texts of Articles 173 (1)(j) and (k) and
259(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. We have included the provisions below for ease of
reference:
173. (1) The guiding values and principles of the public service include the following…
(j) adequate and equal opportunities for appointments, training, and advancement of
members of both gender and members of all ethnic groups; and
(k) representation of persons with disabilities in the composition of the public service at all
levels.
259. (1) Where a person is empowered to make a nomination or an appointment to a public
office, that person shall ensure – …
(b) that fifty percent of each gender is nominated or appointed from the total available
positions, unless it is not practicable to do so; and
(c) equitable representation of the youth and persons with disabilities, where these qualify
for nomination or appointment.
The Zambian Constitution provides guidance on how it should be interpreted. Article 1 of the
Constitution declares the Constitution supreme. Therefore, any law or practice contradicting it
is, to the extent of the inconsistency invalid.
Article 267(1) of the Constitution provides in mandatory terms, how the Constitution shall be
interpreted, stating that:
This Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Bill of Rights and in a
manner that-

E.A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (2nd edn, Toronto: Butterworths 1983) 87.
Minister of Home Affairs and Attorney General v Lee Habasonde (2007) ZR 207 as found in O’Brien Kaaba;
Felicity Kayumba Kalunga; and Pamela Towela Sambo (2021) ‘Is the Constitutional Court Fanning the Flames
of Potential Unrest? A Review of Recent Political Cases,’ SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 10, 3132.
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(a)Promotes its purpose, values, and principles;
(b)Permits the development of the law; and
(c) Contributes to good governance.
Further Article 8 of the Constitution provides for national values, which include democracy
and constitutionalism, social justice, good governance, and integrity. Article 9 makes it
mandatory for a court to apply these values in its interpretation.
It is evident early into the decision that the majority of the ConCourt is not employing the
widely accepted principle to statutory interpretation. Rather, the majority takes to piecemeal
interpretations of the provisions of the Constitution and does so in a way that is incongruent
with the guiding principles and purposes set out within the Constitution. Furthermore, the
ConCourt’s decision runs counter to the intention of Parliament in drafting the Constitution as
it did regarding gender parity and the inclusion of youth and persons with disabilities in the
political sphere. It is also painfully evident that the manner in which the majority chooses to
interpret the provisions shows bias towards the President.
First, the majority outlines the requisite standard of proof required under the Constitution. The
majority reminds the parties that the Petitioners bear the onus of presenting evidence to
establish that the President’s appointment process ran afoul of constitutional requirements.
Justice Munalula in her dissenting opinion helpfully points out that the numbers speak for
themselves to show that gender parity was not achieved. 5 Fifty percent of each gender was not
nominated or appointed. This is sufficient evidence that the nomination process used by the
President ran afoul of Articles 173 and 259 of the Constitution. It would follow then that the
Attorney General, on behalf of the President, would provide evidence explaining why it was
not ‘practicable’ in the circumstances for the President to use a process to appoint more women
to achieve gender parity and fulfil the requirements under the Constitution. However, the
majority does not extend their consideration beyond the strict burden of proof.
Second, the ConCourt then examines the rationale behind Article 173 of the Constitution. The
majority contends that Article 173 read together with Article 266 relates to values and
principles intended to guide the appointing authority, the President, in making nominations or
appointments in the public service. 6 The majority then turns to Article 259 and essentially read
the Article with an emphasis on the qualifying language contained therein. 7 The majority
appears to actively make arguments to support why the President’s appointment process did
not run afoul of the Constitution. The ConCourt selects provisions within the Constitution
which support the President’s authority to make certain decisions. The majority blatantly fails
to extend their analysis further to outline additional duties and responsibilities of the President,
which further illustrates their flawed reasoning that essentially renders their decision
problematic and would lead to contradictions within the Constitution.
The majority’s position can be narrowed down to this: the President as an appointing authority
has unfettered discretion to make appointments under the Constitution. Simply put, the
President is above the Constitution and above the law regarding the appointment process, and
the ConCourt cannot interfere with his decisions. Accordingly, the President as an appointing
authority does not have to ensure that gender parity and the equitable representation of youth
and persons with disabilities are achieved.
Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General, 2020/CCZ/0013, [1.1 of the dissenting
reasons].
6
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This interpretation is simply absurd. In a Constitutional Democracy where the Rule of Law is
observed, nobody is above the law. As Justice Munalula stated in her dissenting reasons in
Maambo & Others v The People, “under constitutionalism all power must be checked in some
way or another.” 8
In Maambo & Others v The People, the ConCourt was tasked to interpret the provisions of
Article 180(4)(c) and (7) of the Constitution, specifically examining the exercise of power
vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to enter a nolle prosequi to discontinue
criminal proceedings. 9 The majority in that case employed the primary principle of
interpretation, namely that the meaning of the provisions should be derived from a plain
meaning of the of the language used in the provision. 10 The majority held that the DPP has
unfettered power under Article 180 and can enter a nolle prosequi without providing reasons.
Justice Munalula in the dissenting opinion recognises the importance of the purposive approach
and the basic principle that the Constitution must be read holistically.11 Justice Munalula
emphasises that Article 267 of the Constitution serves as a key interpretation guide to the
Constitution:
In my view, Article 267 requires that the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that
broadens rather than narrows fundamental human rights; that strengthens the democratic
tenets of our governance system; and that will grow our jurisprudence. 12
In her dissenting reasons, Justice Munalula employs the purposive approach by examining the
words of Article 180 of the Constitution. She makes clear that if drafters intended for the DPP
to have unfettered discretion, they would have expressly used those words within the
Constitution. 13 Her Honour then reviews the language in the Constitutions from other
jurisdictions, as well as the draft Constitution and examines the purposes of the provisions as
drafted including the recommendations. Additionally, she reviews the leading authority to
interpret the impugned language within Article 180, and finally she reads the provision
considering the entire Constitution. Using the purpose approach to statutory interpretation,
Justice Munalula finds that the DPP does have discretion to enter a nolle prosequi. However,
the DPP must provide reasons for entering a nolle prosequi to discontinue criminal
proceedings. The reasons serve as a mechanism which checks the DPP’s exercise of power.
The purposive approach as used by Justice Munalula is the correct approach to statutory
interpretation. It allows for an extensive analysis of provisions within the Constitution and
facilitates sitting Justices to provide reasoned decisions regarding the interpretation of the
Constitution.
Constitutional courts in common law jurisdictions often use the purposive approach to interpret
an enactment within the context of the law’s purpose. In Canada, the Persons Case (Edwards
v Canada (AG) 14 was a landmark case in two respects. The case established that Canadian
women were eligible to be appointed as senators. Furthermore, it established that the Canadian
Constitution should be interpreted in a way that was more consistent with the needs of society.

Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1136.
Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1091.
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Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1092.
11
Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1112-1113.
12
Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1114-1115.
13
Maambo & Others v The People, 2016/CC/R001, 1118.
14
Edwards v Canada (AG), [1930] AC 124, [1929] All ER Rep 571.
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In the present case, Justice Munalula again engages in a purposive approach in the
interpretation of Articles 173 and 266 of the Constitution in her dissenting reasons. In doing
so, Her Honour provides a sobering voice among the cacophony of problematic reasoning in
the majority decision. Her Honour reminds the Court that the President is a public official who
is mandated to act in accordance with the Constitution, and his discretion is necessarily fettered
by Constitutional imperatives. 15 Under Articles 90, 91(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the
President has an obligation to ensure gender parity in making appointments to Ministerial
offices. 16 When the words of Articles 173 and 266 are read in relation to other provisions within
the Constitution, the President has an obligation under the Constitution to ensure gender parity
is achieved, as well as the representation of youth and persons with disabilities in political
appointments.
Gender Parity and Outdated Gender Stereotypes
The reasoning the majority relies upon to explain the failure to achieve gender parity is frankly
outdated, supports gender stereotypes, reinforces cultural and society discrimination against
women in the political sphere.
The majority appears to equate low numbers of candidates who are female, youth or persons
with disabilities with a lack of skilled or qualified individuals within these enumerated
groups. 17 Additionally, the ConCourt references the Final Report of the Technical Committee
on Drafting the Zambian Constitution which states that fulfilling gender parity might be
difficult in situations where one gender would not be competent for the job. 18 Such statements
fail to consider the barriers in place which would preclude women from attaining the requisite
competency for participation in political parties. Jo Beall in her paper ‘Decentralizing
government and centralizing gender in Southern Africa: Lessons from the South African
experience’ explains that:
In Africa, many of the societal institutions that permeate local governance systems and
procedures, notably customary law, and traditional authority, are deeply patriarchal and are
based on relations of power that are difficult for women to penetrate or challenge. 19
The patriarchal and misogynistic beliefs and attitudes hamper the ability of women to even
venture into politics. This is further challenged by the fact that political parties function as
gatekeepers, given the way in which they select their political candidates. Melanie L. Phillips
notes that candidate selection in Zambia is a long, closed-door process which requires rounds
of interviews at each level of the political structure. 20 Gatekeepers evaluate the candidates
based on their expectations of family norms and hierarchy, and their family’s involvement in
politics. 21 Phillips notes:

Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General, 2020/CCZ/0013, [2.2] of the
dissenting reasons.
16
Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General, 2020/CCZ/0013, [2.4] of the
dissenting reasons].
17
Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General, 2020/CCZ/0013, [5.33].
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Chapter One Foundation Limited and 2 Others v The Attorney General, 2020/CCZ/0013, [5.18].
19
Jo Beall (2005) ‘Decentralizing government and centralizing gender in Southern Africa: Lessons from the
South African experience,’ UNRISD Occasional Paper, No. 8, United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD), Geneva, 1.
20
Melanie L. Phillips (2021) ‘Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers’ (under
review), Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 13.
21
Melanie L. Phillips (2021) ‘Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers’ (under
review), Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 9 and 10.
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Women face an impossible double-bind: they either fulfill the cultural expectation of having
a family, where domestic responsibilities and household bargaining puts stringent
limitations on their resources to commit to politics, or they do not conform and face backlash
from the selectorate. 22
The majority does not address these barriers to women’s participation in politics and relies on
the age-old excuse of having insufficient qualified female candidates. 23 Furthermore, the
majority places the responsibility of ensuring gender parity on political parties, obfuscating the
fact that it is at this level where gender discrimination, misogyny and patriarchal attitudes act
manifest strongly and prevent the inclusion of women as political candidates.
Finally, despite the use of the purposive approach in Constitutional courts, the provisions on
how to interpret the constitution, and Justice Munalula’s dissenting opinion in Maambo &
Others v The People, the ConCourt chose to disregard these canons of interpretation and missed
the mark. The court in its over-zealousness rendered an absurd decision that failed to address
the needs of society by permitting the development of the law to achieve gender parity.
As a result, the decision rendered by the majority is retrogressive. The majority missed an
opportunity to protect gender parity as intended by the Constitution. It is difficult to imagine
that gender equity can be achieved through decisions rendered by the ConCourt. However,
there are lessons to follow from Rwanda’s experience if Zambia is to attain gender equity. The
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003 (revised in 2015) enshrines the principles of
gender equality and women’s rights and requires that a minimum of 30% of women be included
in all decision-making bodies. It further commits to establishing a gender-friendly legal and
policy framework. There has been resounding success, with women comprising of 62% of
members in Parliament after the 2018 Parliamentary elections. Rwanda has become the world
leader for women’s representation in decision-making positions.
Judicial Accountability
Muna Ndulo describes judicial accountability as “a fundamental democratic requirement”
which requires judges to be accountable to the public in their role of applying the law in a fair
and impartial manner. 24
It involves two tenets: (a) judicial power must exist as a power separate from and
independent of, executive and legislative power and (b) judicial power must repose in the
judiciary as a separate organ of government, composed of persons different from and
independent of those who compose the executive and legislature.
An independent judiciary must be so both in fact and in perception. They must exercise their
powers without influence from any external party, and their decisions must not be influenced
by other branches of government. 25 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in her address on Judicial Accountability provides
examples of how judges can be held to account: 1) the sanction of removal; 2) the built-in

Melanie L. Phillips (2021) ‘Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers’ (under
review), Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 18.
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Just System,’ Zambia Social Science Journal: Vol. 2: No, 1, Article 3, 2.
25
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accountability of the open court processes; 3) public and peer review; and 4) the principle of
defence developed as a protection against uncontrolled judicial power. 26
We will focus on two aspects that are mentioned above. The third talks about, the use of public
and peer review to hold judges in account. The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin
explained the importance of peer review:
… Peer review comes in a number of forms. Appellate review is the most obvious. All
judicial decisions, with the exception of the decisions of the court at the apex of the judicial
system, are open to appeal. When judges make mistakes, their decisions can be overturned
on appeal. At the highest court level, the Supreme Court of Canada, the rationale is that the
buck has to stop somewhere, and the likelihood of error is greatly decreased if more minds
are brought to bear on the problem at hand. Moreover, the Court has the power to overrule
statements of law made in its own earlier decisions. 27 (emphasis added)
The ConCourt was established pursuant to Article 127 of the Constitution. The ConCourt is at
the same level as the Supreme Court of Canada. Therefore, there are no avenues to appeal any
decision made by the ConCourt. This is problematic because there is no peer review available
for other judges to examine the decisions made by the ConCourt. Even where judges make
mistakes or decisions which are not sound, there are no other avenues to correct these wrongs.
For example, the ConCourt employed a literal interpretation of the Constitution in a matter
which gave the DPP unfettered decision-making in Maambo & Others v The People. In the
present case, the ConCourt again decided in a manner which led to absurd results which do not
adhere to the principles of interpretation within the Constitution. This was done despite Justice
Munalula’s helpful explanation of how the Constitution should be interpreted in both Maambo
& Others v The People and the present case.
While peer review from other judges is not available at the ConCourt, peer review can be
achieved through lawyers and legal academics who review the cases and provide commentaries
on judicial decisions. 28 It is unclear the weight such public review bears on how decisions are
made, or whether judges on the ConCourt will amend the way in which they render their
decisions. However, lawyers and legal scholars as a community can provide a voice to
challenge the way the ConCourt renders their decisions.
We now turn to the fourth, regarding the means of holding judges to account: the principle of
deference developed as a protection against uncontrolled judicial power. This principle of
deference does not exist in the ConCourt, at least not in a substantive manner. Decisions made
in the ConCourt are not reviewable as they are a final court. The ConCourt does not defer even
to the Supreme Court of Zambia. The ConCourt may defer to their own prior decisions, but if
those decisions were incorrectly decided, then the errors will continue into subsequent
decisions. In such a reality and with some questionable decisions from the ConCourt, it is
highly likely that the ConCourt could render a decision with principles which run counter to
those developed by the Supreme Court. This would lead to incoherent decisions and conflicts
between the two highest courts in Zambia. It is evident that more robust means of holding
judges in the ConCourt is required. As Ndulo notes:

The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, PC, CC, CStJ, ‘Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley
McLachlin, P.C.,’ Conference on Law and Parliament (Ottawa, 2 November 2006).
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McLachlin, P.C.,’ Conference on Law and Parliament (Ottawa, 2 November 2006).
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McLachlin, P.C.,’ Conference on Law and Parliament (Ottawa, 2 November 2006).
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Constitutional democracy is founded upon the notion of checks and balances, namely the
judiciary and the executive, while operating independently of one another, act to check each
other's operations and balance each other's power [...] It requires independent, functional,
and credible courts in order to translate constitutional provisions and principles into practice
and into meaningful checks on government. 29
Given that the ConCourt lacks the requisite checks and balances, it is imperative that individual
judges remain independent. Ndulo proposes a means to ensure individual independence of the
judges:
…First, judges must be protected from the threat of reprisals, so that fear does not direct
their decision-making. Second, the method by which judges are selected, and the ethical
principles imposed upon them, must be constructed so as to minimize the risk of corruption
from outside threats. 30
He notes that the second point is to ensure that judicial authority is not abused, and it is the
core concern of judicial accountability. Simply stated, judges must be hired knowing that they
are protected from any external reprisals by relying on the very Constitution they are tasked to
interpret. If judges on the ConCourt rely on the principles and purposes of the Constitution as
set out therein, they should be able to render decisions which are viewed as just and fair in
accordance with the Constitution. We posit that this will increase public trust in the system and
foster support from the public, lawyers, and legal scholars in matters where there may be
attempted political interference. Essentially, the very systems judges may be disabusing, are
the ones which will protect them from external influence if they adhere to them strictly.
Unfortunately, the present decision does not ensure coherency of the Constitution. If anything,
the Constitution has been used as a tool to provide unfettered decision-making responsibility
which privileges individuals or exempts others from accountability under the Constitution.
Absent an intentional and structured approach to statutory interpretation, the ConCourt will
cause further confusion rather than provide an illuminating analysis of the Constitution.
Conclusion
It is evident that gender equity cannot be fully achieved through decisions rendered exclusively
by the ConCourt. However, the ‘Courts of justice can be powerful agents for social change
when they work without gender bias and support gender equality, as their pronouncements
carry the backing of the state and may thus be enforced or become a norm across a broad range
of citizens through established channels of state-citizen engagement’ 31 In conclusion, if
Zambia is to achieve gender parity and the representation of youth and persons with disabilities
in politics, the ConCourt must be committed to, a) interpreting the Constitution in a manner
which aligns with the principles and values set out in the Constitution, and b) ConCourt needs
to offer extensive well-reasoned analysis of the Constitution within context of the laws’
purpose.
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